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when the principal is not due, but the interest is, a general
payment is applied first to the interest, and the residue to the
principal first to become due, so as to stop interest pro tanto,
from the'time of payment. But if neither principal nor interest
is due, then the payment is applied to the extinguishment of principal and interest rateably: Jencks v. Alexander, 10 Paige 619.
If there be several debts of the same degree, all carrying interest,
a payment will be applied to extinguish the interest of all the
debts, before reducing the principal of any one: Steele v. Taylor,
4 Dana 445, 450. And so it is presumed if there were two debts,
one bearing interest and the other not, the law would direct the
interest due to be discharged before the principal of either was
reduced. This principle of applying a payment first to extinguish
the interest, as the interest bears no interest, is clearly analogous
to the applying it first to the payment of a non-interest-bearing
debt, in preference to one that bears interest, and hence in carrying out the presumed intention of the creditor goes far to sustain
the principle of the common law. This principle, it is now submitted, is so far in the ascendant that the time is not far distant
when it will be universally recognised.
A. D.

RECENT AMERICAN

DECISIONS.

Court of Appeals of Kentucky.
LOUISVILLE AND NASHVILLE RAILROAD COMPANY v. JERRY
COLLINS.
Where an employee upon a railway is injured by the negligence of the engineer
of the company, and is himself guilty only of such neglect and want of care, as
w6uld not have exposed him to the injury but for the gross neglect of the engineer,
and when the engineer might with ordinary care have avoided the injury, he is not
precluded from maintaining his action.
What is gross neglect in the engineer may be determined by the court, as a
question of law, when there is no controversy in regard to the facts.
In regard to those acts of a corporation which require care, diligence, and judgment, and which it performs through the instrumentality of general superintending
agents, the corporation itself is to be regarded as always present supervising the
action of its agents.
The rule of law, that the master is not responsible to one of his servants, for an
injury inilicted through the negligence of a fellow-servant, is not adopted, to the
full extent of the English decisions, in the state of Kentucky. The rule is there
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regarded as anomalous, inconsistent with principle, analogy, and public policy, and
unsupported by any good or consistent reason.
In regard to all servants of tle company acting in a subordinate sphere, the one
class to another, and receiving injuries while in the performance of duties under
the command of a superior, whose authority they had no right to disobey or disregard, it is the same precisely as if the injury were inflicted by the act of the
,ompany ; and if there is any want of care and skill in the superior, such as his
position and duty reasonably demand, the company are responsible.
In such cases there is no implied undertaking on the part of the servant to risk
the conequences of the misconduct of the agent of the company under whoqe
authority he acted, and through whose negligence he received the injury.
Servants so situated, in distinct grades of superiority and subordination, are not
to be considered as " fellow-servants," or "in the same service ;" but rather in the
light of strangers to each other's duties and responsibilities ; and the subordinate
may recover of the company for any injury sustained by reason of the ordinary
neglect of the superior.
But if the subordinate is himself guilty of any want of ordinary care, whereby he
is more exposed to the injury, he cannot recover, unless the superior was guilty
of wilful misconduct or gross neglect, but for which he might have avoided inflicting
the injury, notwithstanding the negligence of the other party.
Where, therefore, an engineer, while upon his engine, ordered a common laborer
to do some needed work under the engine, in fastening bolts or screws belonging
to it; and such workman, while lying upon his back in the performance of the
service, had both his legs cut off, by the movement of the engine forward and backward, through the gross neglect or wilful misconduct of such engineer, the company
are responsible for the injury, notwithstanding there might have been some want
of ordinary care on the part of the subordinate, contributing to some extent to the
injury, but not necessitating it, except through the gross misconduct of the superior.
Per RolERTsox, C. J.-We do not consider that the rule exempting the company
from responsibility for injuries inflicted upon their servants, through the want of
ordinary care in other servants of the company, extends beyond those who are
strictly "fellow-servants" in the same grade of employment, and where one is not
subject to the order or control of the others.
Beyond this the company is responsible for the consequences of the misconduct
of superiors towards inferiors in its service, the same as towards strangers.

APPEAL from Warren Circuit Court.

The opinion of the court was delivered by
ROBERTSON, C. J.-This appeal presents, for the first time, to
the appellate court of Kentucky a new and unsettled question,
involving the legal liability of railroad companies for damages
resulting to an inferior from the negligence of a superior employee while engaged in different spheres of employment in the
common service of any such corporation.
The appellee, while employed by the Louisville and Nashville
Railroad Company, as a common laborer, in loading and unloading its burthen-cars, engaged in carrying for its road cross-ties
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and iron, was required, with a co-laborer of the same class, to
assist its engineer in righting, in Bowling Green, Kentucky, a locomotive which seemed to be out of order.
And the steam being up, the front wheels jacked, the hind wheels
unscotched, the engineer on top, and the appellee working, as
ordered, beneath; the engine moved forward, and cut off one of
the appellee's legs, and that motion being reversed by the engineer, the other leg also was cut off.
For that irreparable loss, dooming him to hopeless poverty and
dependence, the appellee sued the appellant for tort, and recovered
a judgment for $5000 damages, as assessed by the jury.
The appellant denies that its engineer was guilty of culpable
negligence, and insists also that as he was competent and trustworthy, it is not responsible to his co.emplopee for his negligence,
however gross.
The Circuit Court instructed the jury that, if they believed
that the accident resulted from the gross negligence of the engineer, the appellant was liable for it in this action.
After full and careful consideration, we are satisfied that the
engineer was guilty of some negligence.
The degree of it was a question of fact which, on such apparently conflicting testimony, the jury had the right to decide ; and
whatever deduction may be most logical and consistent, we are
also satisfied that the circumstances, as detailed by all the witnesses, authorized the jury to find that his negligence was "gross."
An elaborate analysis of all the facts would not, therefore, be
either useful or pertinent in this opinion.
But the appellant assumes that the appellee's own fault contri
buted to the catastrophe-and he thereupon insists that the
co-operation of even the gross negligence of the engineer will not
sustain the action. The assumption is not sufficiently maintained,
nor is the conclusion from it altogether unexceptionable or true.
The engineer does testify that he directed the appellee and his
associate in the work to "block" the wheels, and says that such
a precaution would have prevented the accident. But others
who heard all that was said, and saw all that was done on that
occasion, do not corroborate, but, by strong implication, negative
his stattment of that fact, rather discredited by the incredible
omission, and by his failure to see that danger, so imminent in
his opinion, was not averted by a security so obvious to him and
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so easy to them, and his credibility is also impaired by his interest
and zeal, and his conduct in hiding himself, and abandoning his
post in the appellant's service, almost immediately after the infliction of the injury on the appellee. And not only may we presume that the appellee, a young and unskilled laborer, was ignorant
of the utility of scotching, but feel sure that the engineer either did
not advise or direct it, or was guilty of gross negligence in placing
him in so much peril under the engine withouft seeing that its
stationary attitude was first secured by blocking, and also in using
no means of keeping down the steam, or preventing its accumulation, although the appellee was kept under the locomotive
more than an hour, the steam increasing and the wheels unscotched
all the time.
But had the appellee been guilty of negligence, nevertheless
the injury might have been avoided by the proper care of the
engineer, and is therefore attributable to his gross negligence. In
such a case both principle and preponderating authority seem to
decide that such a remediable fault of the person injured should
not exonerate the wrongdoer from legal liability for the damage
which, without gross negligence, he could have prevented, and
was as much bound by law to prevent in that as he would have
been in any other case.
In running its locomotive and its passenger and burthen cars,
a railway corporation is required by law to observe at least ordinary care, vigilance, and skill, so far as strangers may be affected
by the employment of a motive power, so tremendous and destructive as unregulated, or carelessly or unskilfully regulated steam,
and, as in every class of cases of bailment or trust, the requisite
care is proportioned to the danger of neglect, and the difficulty
of conservative management, ordinary care, in many classes of
cases, might be ordinary neglect, and ordinary neglect might be
gross neglect in steam operations on a railway.
In all those operations the invisible corporation, though never
actually, is yet always constructively present, through its acting
agents who represent it, and whose acts, within their representative spheres, are its acts. Had the appellee been a stranger, tfo
appellant would therefore have been certainly suable and responsible in this action; and we cannot admit that the appellee's relation as an employee in its service, should exempt the corporation
from that general liability, as it might perhaps do by the applica
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tion of a recent rule adjudged in England, with some exceptions,
and echoed with still more exceptions by a few American courts.
But this anomalous rule, even as sometimes qualified, is, in our
opinion, inconsistent with principle, analogy, and public policy,
and is unsupported by any good or consistent reason.
In the use and control of the engine, the engineer is the chief
and governing agent of the corporation, and all his associates in
that employ]ment are employees in "1a common service." Neither
of these subordinates under his control is, as between themselves,
an agent of the railway company, and therefore it is not respon
sible for any damage by one of them to another while in its service. And so far the British rule has foundation in both reason
and analogy; but beyond this it is baseless of any other support
than a falsely assumed public policy or implied contract. In the
employment and control of his subordinates, the engineer acts as
the representative, agent of the common superior-the corporalion. They have no authority to control or resist him in his
allotted sphere of service. And why, then, should the law imply
a contract to trust him alone, and never look to the corporation,
as his employer and constituent, for indemnity for damage resulting from his wilful wrongs, or grossly negligent omissions ? When
they engaged to serve under him perhaps they knew nothing of
his trustworthiness 6r his credit. But they knew that they would
serve a corporation, and probably faith in its responsibility and
protection induced them to venture into its service. And this
faith may be presumed to include an assurance of safety as well
as of pay.
Perhaps, if they had understood that the corporation would not
be responsible for the conduct of its engineer, they would never
have risked such service under him. The contract implied by
law would therefore rather- seem to be that the subordinates should
look to the corporation, and not to its agent alone, for indemnity
for loss arising to them from his unskilfulness or culpable negligence. Nor can we perceive how public policy could be subserved
by the irresponsibility of the corporation in such a case. Such
exemption, if known, might possibly stimulate the subordinates to
a more vigilant observance 6f the engineer's conduct. But why
should they be left to depend on that which could be of little if
any avail to prevent the unskilfulness or negligence of a superior
above their dictation or control ?
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In-undertaking the perilous service they might be presumed to
risk the hazards necessarily incident to their employment, and as
they could not expect infallibility in the management of the loco-motive and its running train, and as they knew that the most
faithful and skilful managers may occasionally lapse into common
blunders and ordinary negligences, the law might imply an agreement to risk their possible occurrence. But the corporation being
under an implied obligation to provide sound and safe cars and
engines, and a competent and faithful engineer, his subordinates
cannot reasonably be presumed to expect or to hazard his gross
negligence, which borders on fraud and crime.
And it seems to us, therefore, that while the corporation may
not be responsible to them for his ordinary negligence, both justice and policy require that it should be held liable for his gross
negligence, as its chief and controlling agent in the management
of its running train. Assurance of protection to this extent, not
only appears just and reasonable, but, by inspiring more confidence, would enable the corporation to obtain and keep better
employees, and at cheaper rates. This doctrine, therefore,
instead of its converse, seems to be suggested by reason and
commended by policy.
But in this respect employees, like the appellee, in a distinct
and altogether different department of service, stand in an essentially different category.
In their employmend having nothing to do with the cars or
the running of them, they, like the corporation's mere woodchoppers, are comparative strangers to the engineer and his
running operations, and seem to be entitled to all the security of
strangers. They may be presumed to know no more than strangers
about the skill or care of the engineer, nor have they any more
control over him, or connection with his running arrangements or
operations. They are therefore not, in the essential sense of
contradistinctive classification, "1in the same service" with the
engineer and his running co-operators, who act in a different
sphere and constitute a distinct class. Consequently neither of
the assumed reasons for the British rule as to employees "1in the
same service" can be in any way consistently applied as between
the engineer and such common laborers as the appellee. And the
apparent extension of the rule to them may be deemed inadvertent,
or not carefully and logically considered with rational discrimina-
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tion and precision. We therefore can neither feel the rationale,
nor acknowledge the authority of the crude and self-contradictory
decisions, or loose and incongruous dicta, referred to on that
subject. But to harmonize the law, we must recognise a more
congenial principle of normal vitality, and adjudge, as we now
do, that the appellee, in his humble and isolated employment,
should be treated as a stranger to the engine as a motive power,
and, if without fault himself, might, like other strangers, recover
from the railway corporation for a loss arising from the ordinary
negligence of its engineer. But as the jury might possibly have
found that he himself had been negligent, the Circuit Court was
right in requiring proof of gross negligence by the engineer,
which in that contingency Would have been necessary to the
liability of the appellant.
The only consistent or maintainable principle of the corporation's responsibility is that of agency: " Qui facit per alium,
facit per se." It is therefore responsible for the negligence or

unskilfulness of its engineer, as its controlling agent in the
management of its locomotives and running cars; and that responsibility is graduated by the classes of persons injured by the
engineer's neglect or want of skill. As to strangers, ordinary
negligence is sufficient ; as to subordinate employees, associated
with the engineer in conducting the cars, the negligence must be
gross; but as to employees in a different department of service,
unconnected with the running operations, ordinary negligence
may be sufficient. Among common laborers constituting a distinct
class, all standing on the same platform of equality and power,
and engaged in a merely incidental but independent service, no
one of them, as between himself and his co-equals, is the corpo-

ration's agent; and therefore it is not, on the principle of agency
or otherwise, responsible for damage to one of them resulting
from the act or omission of another of them, although each of the
company's employees would be its agent as to entire strangers
to it.
This is the only doctrine we can recognise as consistent with
the enlightened and homogeneous jurisprudence of this clearer
day of its ripening maturity. _And looking through the mist of
the adjudged cases and elementary dicta, we can see no other
fundamental principle which can mould them into a consistent or
abiding form.

272

RAILROAD CO. v. COLLINS.

That principle is the only safe clue to lead the bewildered
explorer to the light which shows the sure way of right, and
proves the true doctrine of American law.
We feel authorized to conclude that the appellant was legally
liable to the appellee for the injury done to him by the gross
ngligence of its engineer; that the court, on the trial, gave to
the jury the true and only true law, and that the verdict. was
authorized by both the law and the facts: and we would overstep
the judicial line by interfering with such a verdict, in such a case,
on the ground of alleged exorbitance, indicating neither passion,
partiality, nor prejudice.
Wherefore the judgment is affirmed.
We have presented a very extended
syllabus of the foregoing case, at the beginning, embracing all the points upon
which the opinion of the court is given,
without regard to their being directly and
necessarily involved in the decision of the
cause. And notwithstanding the avowed
willingness of the learned judge to disregard the general current of authority
upon the point, and the apparent spirit
of freedom with which he deals with the
decisions in other states and countries,
notwithstanding all this, and more that
might fairly be said as to the fearlessness
and disregard of self with which the opinion abounds; which is not altogether
common in dealing with the opinions of
such men as Lord ABINGER and Ch. J.
SH.w, and a host of others starcely less
eminent in their field of service; notwithstanding all this, which has rather
surprised us, we must confess at the same
time that we could not but regard it as a
refreshing exception to the proverbial
subserviency of opinion to precedent and
analogy, and we have felt compelled to
the conclusion that the opinion is altogether entirely sound in its principles,
and maintained with very uncommon
ability, in its logic as well as its illustrations, both of which seem altogether unexceptionable.
Bat we must warn those members of

the profession, who are not altogether
aware of the extent of the decisions in
the opposite direction, that they embrace
a very large number of the best-considered English cases ; and an equal number, almost, in the American states, jneluding all, as far as we know, with the
exception of Ohio and Georgia, and now
Kentucky. And the decisions in these
latter states are all attempted to be placed
upon peculiar grounds, thereby virtually
confessing the soundness of the general
rule, that one cannot recover of his employer for an injury inflicted through the
want of care in a fellow-servant employed
in the same department of the master's
business, and under the same general
control. This is declared by the learned
judge in the principal case.
The opinion in the principal case would
have been far more satisfactory, if the
learned judge could have devoted more
labor and time to the matter. If a
careful review of the preceding cases,with
the reasoning of the judges, could have
been presented in the very carefully prepared opinion, it could not have failed to
be more valuable. Discussion of a broad
principle is much less expensive to the
author and far less satisfactory, as a
general thing, to the profession, than a
careful review of the cases.
We should not expect our readers
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would here listen to such an attempt on
our part, since it must occupy considerable space, and would be merely professional, instead of being clothed with the
weight of judicial authority. "We shall,
therefore, not attempt it, having many
years since presented our own views to
the public upon this and the analogous
questions: Redf. on Railways 384-390.
But we have noticed with gratification
more for the justice of the view than because we had before contended for the
same, that the learned judge declares
most unequivocally, in the principal case,
that the corporation is to be regarded as
constructively present in all acts performed by its general agents, within the
scope of their authority, i. e., within the
iange of their ordinary employment.
The consequences of mistake or misapprehension, upon this point, have led
many courts into conclusions greatly at
variance with the common instincts of
reason and humanity, and have tended
to interpose an unwarrantable shield between the conduct of railway employees
and the just responsibility of the company. We trust that the reasonableness
and justice of this construetion will, at
no distant day, induce its universal adoption. See Redfield on Railways, § 69,
pl. 6, 7, 8, 9, and notes, and cases cited.
In regard to the leading point involved
in the principal case, how far a servant
is entitled to recover of the master for an
injury inflicted by the negligence or want
of skill of a fellow-servant, the doctrine
of exemption was first established in the
Court of Exchequer, in Priestley v. owler, 3 MI.& W. 1, which was decided at
Miehaelmas Term 1837. The same rule
was adopted in this country by the Supreme Judicial Court of Mfassachusetts,
in Farwell v. The Boston and Worcester
Railroad Corporation,4 MNet. 49, at the
March Term 1842, supported by one of
the ablest and most unexceptionable opinions ever delivered from the American
VOL. XI.-I8

Bench; an opinion which has commanded the admiration of the entire profession,
both Bench and Bar, in England as well
as in America; and which has been more
extensively adopted and formally incorporated into the opinions of the English
courts, than, perhaps, any other opinion
of an American judge. This opinion
was in fact preceded 'by that of Murray
v. The South Carolina Railway Co., 1
Mefcullan 385, in the same direction;
but the former has been regarded as the
leading American case.
These leading opinions, in the different
countries, have been followed by a multitude of cases reaching down to the present time, most of them occupied in the
discussion of what were claimed to be
exceptional cases. In England we may,
among a multitude of others, refer to
Hutchinson v. York, Newcastle, and Berwick Railway, 5 Exch. 343; Tflgmore
v. Jay, Id. 354; Skip v. Eastern Counties Railway, 24 Eng. L. & Eq. R. 396;
Degg v. Midland Railway, 1 Hurlst. &
N. 773 ; Tarrant v, Mebb, 37 Eng. L.
& Eq. R. 281 ; 3ellors v. Shaw, 7 Jur.
N. S. 845 ; Seymour v. Maddox, 16 Q.
B. 326 ; Ormond v. Holland, 1 El., BI.
& Ellis 102.
In the American states the decisions
are considerably numerous where the
general principle of the foregoing decisions has been acted upon, or recognised, but we shall not refer to more
than will be requisite to show how far
the rule prevails in different states. It
is adopted in Brown v. Maxwell, 6 Hill
(N. Y.) 592; Coon v. Syracuse and
Utica Railway, 6 Barb. 231 ; s. c. 1
Selden 492, 'and numerous other New
York cases, cited in Redfield on Railways 386-389. See also Honner y. The
Illinois Central Railway, 15 Ill. Rep.
550; Ryan v. Cumberland T"alley Railway, 23 Penna. St. 384; Madison and
IndianapolisRailway v. Bacon, 6 Porter
(Ind.) R. 205; Hawley v. Baltimore
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and Ohio Railway, 6 Am. Law Beg.
352; Frazierv. The Pennsylvania Railway Co., 38 Penna. St. 104; Wright v.
New York CentralRailway, 28 Barb. 80;
Carle v. B. 6- P. Canal and Railway
Co., 43 Maine 269; Noyes v. Smith, 28
Vt. Rep. 59; Indianapolis Railway v.
Love, 10 Indiana R. 554; Same v. Klein,
11 Id. 38. The general principle is
adopted in all the other states where the
question has arisen; for although in
Ohio, in the cases of Little Miami Railway Co. v. Stevens, 20 Ohio 415, and
C. C. 6- C. Railroad Co. v. Keary, 3
Ohio, N. S. 201, the companies are held
responsible for the injury, the decisions
are placed upon the ground, that the
persons injured were in subordinate positions. And in Scudder v. Woodbridge,
1 Kelly 195, it was held the rule did not
excuse the master for injury thus caused
to slaves, mainly upon the same ground
of their dependent and subordinate position. And the principal case is placed
upon the same ground. And in the
more recent case of Whalan v. Mad R.
and Lake Erie Railway Co., 8 Ohio, N.
S. 249, it was held that where one of the
trackmen was injured by the neglect of
the fireman upon one of the trains, there
was no such subordination of position,
as to take the case out of the general rule,
and the case was decided in favor of the
company: thus maintaining the soundness of the general rule in that state by
its latest decision.
It is safe, therefore, to state, that all
the cases, both English and American,
maintain the general rule to the extent
of those who are strictly "fellow-servants" in the same department of service.
And where this is not the fact, but the
employees are so far removed from each
other, that the one is bound to obey the
directions of the other, so that the superior may be fairly regarded as representing the master, we think it more consonant with reason and justice to treat the

matter as not coming within the prir
ciple of the rule. This is so declared by
GAnDINER, J., in Coon v. Syracuse and
Utica Railroad Co., 1 Selden 492. But
this qualification is denied by SHAw, C.

J., in Farwell v. Boston and Worcester
Railway, 4 Met. 49, 60, 61, unless the
departments of service are so far independent as to have no privity with each
other, not being under the control of a
common master. And it -was so decided
in Gillshannon v. Stony Brook Railway
Co., 10 Cush. 228. And it seems finally
to be settled upon authority, that it is
sufficient to bring the case within the
rule, that the servants are employed in
the same common service, as in running
a railway, or working amine: Wright v.
New York CentralRailway, 25 N. Y. Ct.
App. 562, 564, byALTxir,3. The question is whether they are under the same
general control: Abraham v. Reynolds,
5 H. &N. 142 ; Hard, Admr., v.Vermont
and Canada Railroad, 32 Vt. R. 473.
And there is no question, that the
master is responsible for any want of
skill or care, in employing competent
and trustworthy servants, and in sufficient numbers; and in furnishing safe
and suitable machinery for the work in
hand, unless the servants knowing, or
having the means of knowing, of the
deficiency in furnishing proper help or
machinery, consent to continue in the
employment. And the neglect or want
of skill of the master's general agent
employed in procuring help and machinery, is the act of the master: Hardv.
Vermont and Canada Railway Co., sup.;
Wiggett v. Fox, 36 Eng.L. & Eq. R. 486;
Noyes v. Smith, 28 Vt. Rep. 59. Indeed
this exception is recognised in most of
the preceding cases. Many of the late
cases upon the question have turned upon
this point, the general rule having been
regarded as settled beyond question for
many years.
We are not disposed to question the
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extent of the exceptions to the general
rule; and possibly any greater extension
in that direction might essentially impair
the general benefit to be derived from it.
But we would be content to treat all the
subordinates, who were under the control
of a superior, as entitled to hold such

superior, as representing the master, and
the master as responsible for his incompetency or misconduct. We should regard this as a more salutary rule, upon
the whole, than the present one, but the
general current of authority seems greatly
in the opposite direction.
I. F. R.

SuTreme Court of Michigan.
MARAMUS AMPERSE ET AL. v. AUGUSTUS D. BURDENO.
Under statutes giving power to a married woman to enjoy, contract, sell, transfer, convey, devise, or bequeath her property, in the same manner and with like
effect as if she were unmarried, a husband can convey real estate to his wife by
deed directly, without the intervention of a trustee.

The opinion of the court was delivered by
CAMPBELL, J.-Burdeno sued plaintiffs in error in trespass for
alleged wrongful acts upon his freehold, being land covered by
water. The suit was for treble damages to Burdeno, as proprietor
of the land, the statutory action not lying for mere possession:
Achey v. Hull, 7 Mich. R. 423. Defendants offered to show that
Burdeno had, in September 1861, conveyed the property by deed
to his wife, Victoria Burdeno. This deed was objected to as
invalid, because of the relation of the parties; and the court
below sustained the objection, and rejected the evidence.
The question is presented, therefore, whether, as our laws now
stand, a deed can be made by a husband to his wife. To determine this question, we must see how their relations were governed,
in this respect, before our present system was introduced.
The effect of marriage was to produce what is called in the lawbooks unity of person; the husband and wife being but one person'
in the law: Co. Litt. 112 a; 1 Bl. Comm. 442.. The wife, by
her coverture, ceased to have control of her actions or her property, which became subject to the control of her husband, who
alone was entitled, during the marriage, to enjoy the possession
of her lands, and who became owner of her goods and might sue
for her demands. The wife could neither possess nor manage
I We
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property in her own right, could make -no contract of a personal
nature which would bind her, and could bring no suit in her own
name. In short, she lost entirely all the legal incidents attaching
to a person acting in her own right. The husband alone remained
sui juris, as fully as before marriage.
It followed from this legal merger by coverture into a single
personality, that the husband could make no grant to the wife,
and the-wife could make none to the husband. And furthermore,
a grant to her by her husband, of a freehold, would be, in 6ffect,
a grant to take effect in futuro (the husband retaining possession
for life), and such a grant was unlawful because a freehold could
only pass by " livery of seisin, which must operate either immediately or not at all. It would, therefore," continues Blackstone,
"be contradictory, if an estate, which is not to commence till
hereafter, could be granted by a conveyance which imports an
immediate possession:" 2 Bl. Com. 165. But a husband might
make a devise to his wife, " for that such devise taketh no effect
but after the death of the devisor :" Littleton, § 168; Co. Litt.
112 a, b. The same incidents of coverture which made the hus
band sole possessor of his wife's lands, led to the .rulewhich made
estates in their joint names differ from joint tenancies proper, and
regarded the title, not as held by moieties, but as an entirety: 2
Bl. Com. 182; Co. Litt. 187 a.
Whether the common-law rule preventing husband and wife from
making grants to each other is a rule springing from, and inseparably attached to, the relation of marriage, or whether it is an
incident to the wife's disability to control property in her own
right, must guide us somewhat in determining the effect of our
enabling statutes. There can be no doubt that there are incidents
of marriage independent of all considerations of property. The
common-law writers never attempted to classify them, and we
must get such light as we can from examples and analogies. It
is safe, however, to assume that no act can be absolutely inconsistent with the marriage relation, if it has received the sanction
of either law or equity. We must, therefore, see whether the
disabilities which applied at common law, in cases like the one
before us, have been regarded as universal and personal disqualifications. Upon this we have an abundance of authority.
There were local customs whereby a wife might take by imme
diate conveyance from her husband; as, for example, at York:
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Fitzh. Ab. Prescription 61; Brown's Ab. Custom 56 (cited
Tomlyn Law Dic. Baron and Feme). The Queen Consort may
sue and be sued, alone, may take grants from her husband, as
well as from strangers, way take as well as receive grants, and
may covenant: Cor. Dig. Boy, F 1. A husband could convey
to the use of his wife under the Statute of UTes, whereby the -use
vested in her directly as a legal estate, without the action of the
feoffee: Com. Dig. Baron and Ferne, D 1, citing Co. Litt. 112 a,
And he might, under. the same statute, covenat with a third
person to stand seised to the use of his wife: Id.
It appears, therefore, that the law did not prohibit a husband
from accomplishing for his wife the precise thing which he would
have accomplished by a direct conveyance ; and it would seem
from this that the rule was one of technicality, and not of substance. But there are further illustrations which will throw light
upon the subject. When husband and wife were dealing, not in
their own right but in a representative character, or what is
termed technically, in auter droit; either might sell and convey
to the other, as to a stranger: Co. Litt. 112 a, 187 b; Coin, Dig.
Baron and Feme, D 1. It needs no remark to suggest that if
the common law was designed to produce unity of will, and to
prevent action except by one not under influenco or compulsion,
no such practice as this could be permitted; for a husband's
influence over his wife is personal, and will operate just as strongly,
in fact, in one class of deallngs as in another. The rule can only
be made sensible by holding that, as to matters which a wife could
be allowed to hold and manage separately from any interest of her
husband, these disabilities of coverture did not exist, or, in other
words, that they were not regarded as personal only, but as relative to property. Thus far we have considered only such rights
as are legal, as distinguished from equitable, and are enforced in
all courts alike. But there has grown up by the side of the
common law, a system of equitable rights and powers, which
places married women, in regard to property, on the same footing
in most respects with single women. When property is set apart
for the separate use of a married woman, she is, in regard to it,
emancipated from the disabilities of coverture, so far as the terms
of the trust warrant. This emancipation from her legal disabilities
does not depend upon the husband's consent, nor upon any ante-
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nuptial agreement. It can be accomplished by any one, relative
or stranger, who sees fit to provide a fund for her benefit.
She may sue and be sued concerning it; she may contract
concerning it, and her contracts will bind it and be enforced;
jhe may give it, or sell it. Her title is technically an equitable one, and not a legal one; but the trustees are bound to
follow her directions, and the distinction is purely formal. The
income and proceeds are under her separate control and enjoyment, and her husband has nothing to. do with them. Her
doings, though not under the dominion or enforcement of courts
of law, are recognised by such courts as valid, just as they
are recognised and enforced in equity. If the legal disabilities
were essential elements of coverture, then equity, which recognises and follows all the substantial principles of law, could not
dispense with them. It would be a gross absurdity for any court
to destroy the substantial rights of the husband, or remove his
lawful control. And it would be still more absurd to permit this
interference at the hands of any meddling stranger at his option.
But the doctrine has been long settled that as to her separate
estate a wife is on substantially the same footing with afeme sole.
See Pybus v. Smith, 1 Yes. Jr. 189; Sturgis v. Corp., 13 Yes.
R. 190; -Essex v. Atkins, 14 Id. 542; Wagstaff v. Smith, 9
Id. 520; Grigby v. Cox, 1 Yes. Sen. 518; -Freemanv. .More, 1
Bro. P. C. 237, 1 Hoy. Sup. 49-50, 2 Spence's Eq. Jur. 513;
Jacques v. Mliethodist -EpiscopalChurch, 17 J. R. 548, 2 Story
Eq. Jur., § 1395-6.
Not only may she make disposition of it to others, but she
may do so also in favor of her husband. The disability of the
common law which arose from the very fact that she was sub
1otestate viri (and which undoubtedly is usually the case as a
matter of fact to a great degree), was not considered as existing in
equity, which sustained such dealings if fair and not undulybiassed:
2 St. Eq. Jur., § 1395; -Essexv. Atkins, 14 Yes. R. 542; Jaques
v. Illethodist Episcopal Church, 17 J. R. 548, 1 Hov. Sup. 49,
and cases above. She can even bargain with her husband concerning her separate estate, and the agreement will be enforced:
Lady Arundel v. -TPipps, 10 Yes. R. 140 ; Livingston v. Livingston, 2 Johns. Ch. R. 537; Wallingford v. Allen, 10 Pet. R.
585 ; Bullard v. Briggs, 7 Pick. 533.
Instead of looking with disfavor upon the settlement of separate
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property, equity has favored it. A separate estate will not fail
for the lack of trustees, and if the legal title comes into the hus.
band's hands, he himself will be held to be a trustee to his wife's
separate use, and therefore subject to her orders ; and he may be
made a trustee expressly: 2 Kent's Com. 162; 2 Spence's Eq.
Jur. 507; Wallingford v. Allen, 10 Pet. R. 583. Not only
may a husband settle property to his wife's use through trustees,
but he may make himself a trustee by agreement, or even by gift,
where he has by some distinct act set apart the property. In
Lucas v. Lucas, 1 Atk. 270, where a husband caused stock to
be transferred to the name of his wife, although at law it would
of course continue to be his own property, it was held to have
been made his wife's separate fund. So in Siepard v. Slepard,
7 Johns. Oh. RI. 57, and in Tfallingford v. Allen, above cited, it
was held that a conveyance directly from husband to wife should
under the circumstances be enforced as valid in equity.
When equity recognises a power in the wife, who is the disabled
party, not only to deal with others, but even to contract with an&
make provision for her husband out of her separate funds, it can
hardly be claimed that the husband, who was always sui juris, is
restrained by any but technical rules from transferring to her
directly. We have seen that equity will enforce even such conveyances. iBut there never was a time when he could not by his
deed put property where she could control it. If it were not that
by standing in her name he became legally the owner of the
usufruct, there could be no valid reason why any indirection ever
need be resorted to. It is not against the policy of the law that
the wife should have the real benefit of his gift ; and equity, looking through the form at the substance, calls it, as it is in fact, a
gift from husband to wife. The doctrine laid down by CoE ., in
connection with the Statute of Uses, is of itself sufficient to show
that the disability as to conveyances springs entirely from the
wife's incapacity to act for herself; and it is stated in 2 Kent's
Com. 163, n. b., that by the present English statutes a husband
is now authorized to make a direct conveyance to his wife.
Our statutes have given power to a married woman to enjoy,
contract, sell, transfer, mortgage, convey, devise, or bequeath her
property in the same manner, and with the like effect, as if she
were unmarried: 2 C. L. § 3292. Where it stands in trust for her,
the trustees are authorized to transfer it to her : 2 0. L. 3293.
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The statute evidently designs to do away with indirect dealings,
and make her rights legal instead of equitable. Passive trusts
have been entirely abolished, and where a deed creates them the
title passes at once to the beneficiary: 2 C. L. § 2638-4-5. To
require a husband (who is not supposed to be under her control or
fear) to go through the farce of conveying to some one else, who
is at once to pass the property over to his wife, is to keep up a
fiction which has not even a legal basis to support it, since the
husband has ceased to have possessory claims over her property.
He is now in law a stranger to her estate during coverture instead
of its possessor and manager; and his consent is not necessary to
her disposal of it: arr v. Sherman, 11 Mich. Rep. 33; Watson
v. Thurber, 11 Id. 457. Whatever protection she may require
when dealing with him, he certainly never was supposed to need
any against her.
Believing, as we do, that the basis of the common law disability
was in the peculiar disqualifications and burdens of the wife, and
that the removal of these removes all the reasons which ever
required the intervention of equitable trusts, we think there is
now no objection to a deed from husband to wife, which should
render it invalid.
The court erred in excluding the deed. The other points
become immaterial.
Judgment must be reversed, with costs, and a new trial
granted.
0HRISTIANOY and COOLEY, JJ., concurred.

MARTIN, 0. J., was not present.

Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.
LEECH v. OALDWELL.
Where two parties to a contract agree to refer any matter of dispute that may
arise to a third party, whose decision is to be final, and they waive their right of
action at law, they are bound by the decision of such umpire without regard to
mistake or fraud on his part.
The remedy for fraud is an action against the guilty agent, not an action on the
contract.

LEECH v. CALDWELL.
The furthest that the rule has been relaxed in Pennsvlvania is to allow one party
to come into a court of law when the other has refused to join in the choice
of arbitrators, or has prevented the chosen umpire from acting as such.' 1'er
STRoxG, J.

The opinion of the court was delivered by
STRONG, J.-This was an action of covenant brought by Caldwell against Leech, to recover compensation for the graduation,
masonry, and other work done on section 43 of the Alleghepy
Valley Railroad. Leech with others had been contractors for the
work of the entire line and Caldwell was a sub-contractor with
them for the work on one section.
The articles of agreement fixed very precisely the mode in
which alone the sums due from time to time to the sub-contractor
should be ascertained. This they did by reference to the estimates
that the railroad company had agreed with the primary contractors should be m.ade as the work progressed. And it was stipulated, that on or about the first day of each month during the
progress of the work, the estimate made of the quantity and relative value of the work done on the section, by the engineer of the
railroad company, should be conclusive between the parties to the
agreement, of the amount of said work. And that within ten
days after the procurement of a certificate of such estimate from
the railroad company, the defendant should pay eighty-five per
cent. of the amount of such estimate, agreeably to the contract
prices. The agreement then went on to declare, that when all the
work should be completed, there should be a final estimate made
by the chief or associate engineer, of the quality, character, and
value of said work, agreeably to the terms of the agreement, when
the balance appearing due to the sub-contractors should be paid
upon their giving a release. After some other provisions, the

contract concluded with the following clause: "1And it is mutually-i
agreed and distinctly understood, that the decision of the chief
engineer shall be final and conclusive in any dispute which may
arise between the parties to this agreement, relative to or touching
the same, and each and every of said parties do hereby waive any
right of action, suit or suits, or other remedy in law or otherwise,
by virtue of said covenants, so that the decision of said engineer
shall, in the nature of an award, be final and conclusive on the
rights and claims of said parties."
In view of these covenants, irrespective of the stipulation last
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quoted, it is plain the plaintiff can recover for work done by him
under the contract, only after estimates made by the engineer of
the railroad company. Those estimates it was agreed should
determine the quantity of work done, and its value, or the sum
due to the sub-contractor. It was those that the defendant covenanted to pay, and nothing else. Had no provision been made for
an arbitrament, and had there been no waiver of right to sue at
law, it was still an essential prerequisite to any action for work
done under the contract that estimates of it should be made. It
was assumed by both parties that they would be made, and they
were. The amounts certified as due in those that were made
monthly during the progress of the work the plaintiff received,
and gave written acknowledgments of the payments; but he
refusg'd to accept the balance appearing to be due by the final
estimate, alleging that it was erroneous both in the quantity and
in the classification of the work. Doubts were suggested in the
argument whether there was in fact a final estimate, such as was
called for in the articles of agreement. That there was, seems to
us, however, very clear. It is needless to consider the question
now. If there was not, it is certain the plaintiff has no such
cause of action as he asserts. But, assuming that there was a
final estimate, that it was erroneous, and that the covenants of the
defendant were broken, the great question of the case remains,
whether in view of the last clause in the contract any action at
law could be maintained upon it. Provisions similar to this are
often introduced into such contracts, and they have more than
once been under consideration in this court. Even when much
less stringent than the present, they have been held effective to
preclude any resort to an action at law. In The Aon6ngahela
Navigation Company v. .enlon, 4 W. & S. 205, the agreement
to submit did not contain any express waiver of the right to sue
at law for a breach of the contract. It only declared that in any
dispute between the contractor and the company, the decision of
the engineer should be obligatory and conclusive without further
recourse or appeal. Yet it was held that no action by one party
against the other would lie for a breach of the agreement, that the
only resort was to the appointed tribunal. To the same effect are
Faunce v. Burke & Gonder, 4 Harris 480, and other cases more
recently decided. The doctrine of these eases was apparently
acanowledged as a general rule by the learned judge of the court
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below, but he applied it with most important and erroneous excep
tions. Ie instructed the jury that the plaintiff could not escape
the binding force of the clause in the contract, unless recourse to
the tribunal selected was rendered no longer reasonably possible
by circumstances over which he had no control, and which he
could not prevent by reasonable diligence on his part ; that unless
a reference was prevented by act of the defendant; or, secondly,
by the refusal of the chief engineer to act on proper application
made to him; or, thirdly, by such gross and palpable mistake as
amounted to fraud; the plaintiff cannot recover. Thus a wide
door was opened enabling the plaintiff to escape from the stringent
covenant into which he had entered, and by which he had bound
himself to waive any right of action, suit or suits, or other remedy
at law, and to leave the decision of any dispute that might arise,
relative to or touching the agreement, to the final determination
of the engineer. So in the answers to the points presented by the
defendant below, the same exceptions to the rule laid down in
Navigation Company v. .Fenlon were constantly asserted. In
this, we are of opinion there was error. It nowhere appears in
the case, nor is it alleged, that a reference of any dispute between
the parties, to the chief engineer of the railroad company, was
prevented by the defendant. If it had been thus prevented, perhaps the plaintiff might have resorted to a court of law, notwithstanding his waiver of such a right. But the plaintiff rests upon
the allegations, that the engineers were guilty of fraud, or made
gross mistakes in their estimates equivalent to fraud ; and that it
was impracticable to procure the chief engineer to decide the controversy respecting the accuracy of the estimates after it had
arisen. The court recognised these things, if found to have
existed, as relieving the plaintiff from his obligation to waive a
suit at law. But what had the fraud of the engineers, if any, to
do with the plaintiff's covenants? How could the misconduct of
the chosen arbitrator deprive the defendants of a right secured to
them by the contract-the right of exemption from liability to any
suit upon it? If the engineer undertook to act as umpire, and
fraudulently injured the plaintiff, he had a remedy by action
against the guilty agent; but not by suit on the contract. He
cannot punish the defendants for a fault of which they are innocent. And how could the mistake of the engineer alter the cove.
nants of the parties ? By agreeing to refer to him they took the
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risk of his mistakes. They were both interested in having the
estimates made as large as possible; and both were injured by an
under estimate, if one was made. It was in view of such contingencies as the plaintiff alleges have happened, that the parties
renounced their right to any other remedy against each other than
the arbitrament of the chief engineer. None of our cases recognise the mistake or fraud of the appointed umpire as sufficient to
relieve a party from the necessity of resorting to him exclusively.
The farthest limit to which they have gone is, to hold that when
one of the parties has refused to join in the choice of arbitrators,
or has prevented the chosen umpire from acting -as such, the other
party may come into a court of law. The case cited from 4 W.
& S. 05 does not hold that the fraud or mistake of the engineer
in making the estimate, enables the party to withdraw the controversy from his arbitrament. All that was said on this subject
is a remark of Judge RoGERS, that it was not pretended the estimate made by the engineer was made in bad faith, or that
there was any evidence of gross mistake. Ile did not say what
would have been the effect had there been such evidence. And
that was a case wher6 the action was brought against the company
whose engineer was the chosen umpire. There is more reason
for holding such defenddnt responsible-for the bad faith and mistakes of their own officer, than there is for making these defendants suffer for the fraud or errors of the engineer of the Allegheny Valley Railroad Company, over whom they had no control,
and who was an entire stranger to the contract. A reference to
the engineer of a railroad company has even been said to be a
reference to the company itself: Banger v. Great Western Railway Compaany, 27 Eng. Law & Eq. Rep. 85; and hence it may
with some force be argued, that if he is guilty of bad faith, they
ought not to be protected by his action. But when parties agree
to refer to the engineer of a third person, and to be bound by his
umpirage, his fraud or mistake ought not to be permitted to augment the rights of one party to the agreement against the other.
We hold, therefore, that the court below erred in the answers
given to the defendant's eleventh, twelfth, and fourteenth points.
The fraud or mistake of the engineers of the Allegheny Valley
Railroad Company, in making the monthly and final estimates, if
there was such fraud or mistake, did not release the plaintiff from
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his contract, and enable him to bring a suit at law to enforce any
covenant of the defendant.
There was error also in the instruction given respecting the
impracticability of obtaining a revision of the estimates by the
chief engineer. The contract was not that the parties waived any
right of action or suit at law only in the event that it might
prove reasonably impracticable to obtain a decision of the chief
engineer of the railroad company. The possible difficulties of
obtaining such a decision were in view of the parties when the contract was made. The engineer has determined the amount due
the plaintiff in accordance with the articles of agreement. But
the plaintiff alleges that the determination is incorrect. The
burden is upon him to show that it is so, and he has but one way
in which to show it. That is by the revision of the chief engineer. If he meets with difficulties in obtaining that, or.if he cannot obtain it at all, it is his misfortune, not the fault of the defendants; nothing for which they are responsible upon their covenants.
The engineer having made an estimate, the question whether it
was erroneous or not, was a question between him and the plaintiff. There is, as before remarked, no evidence that the defendants ever interposed any obstacle in the way, of the revision of
the estimates by the chief engineer. On the contrary, the proof
is that they requested the plaintiff to have a revision made, and
requested it at a time when the engineer was at hand and could
have made it. No effort was, however, made to obtain such action
until about three years after the final estimate was made, when it
was manifestly impossible to ascertain the amount of work done in
the graduation, or to classify it, if the quantity had been known.
Under such circumstances even an unqualified refusal of Mr.
Roberts, in the fall of 1858 (if the jury had any evidence that
there was such a refusal), to go upon the road and make a measurement of it, did not leave the plaintiff at liberty to sue upon the
contract. And there was no evidence from which the jury could
find such a refusal. If they found it, as they must have done,
they not only found it without evidence, but against evidence, and
there was error in submitting the question to them. We hold that
there was nothing in the request made to Mr. Roberts, or in his
answer, that relieved the plaintiff of his waiver of any right of
action on the contract, especially as the request was so long
delayed. The delay was not excused by the absence of the engi.
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neer. He was indeed away part of the time towards the end of
the work, but the proof is that he was there a part of the time
during the last year, and there after the work was completed:
and no application was made to the railroad company for his presence at any time to revise the estimates, or for the appointment
of any other engineer in case of his absence.
It is of prime importance that parties be held to their contracts.
If permitted to cut themselves loose from an onerous stipulation,
because it may be inconvenient to perform it, there can be no
certainty in agreements. The obligation of a covenant is not
changed by the fact that it has not worked: the results which were
anticipated.
There are other assignments of error in this record which we
need iot notice in detail. What we have said will probably put
an end to the case. And the other questions attempted to be
raised are therefore of no importance.
Judgment reversed, and a venire de novo awarded.
AGNEW,

J., dissented.

In the District Court of the United States for the Distritof
Wisconsin.
THE UNITED STATES v. THE PROPELLER GOVERNOR CUSHMAN;
DWIGHT SCOTT, CLAIMANT.'
Under the Act of Congress which provides that no distilled spirits (arrack and
sweet cordial excetted) shall he imported into the United States, except in casks
or vessels of the capacity of ninety gallons wine measure and upwards, on pain of
forfeiture of such spirits and also of the ship or vessel in which the same may have
been imported (1 Stat, at Large, p. 701, § 103) : Hdd, that where such distilled
spirits had been received on board secretly by employees or servants of the vessel,
without the knowledge of the captain or clerk, and in violation of a standing rule
and positive order, the owners of the vessel would not be liable for their loss, since
they formed no part of the cargo to be placed in the manifest, as such; nor would
the vessel be subject to forfeiture under the circumstances, though such portion of
the spirits as were not allowed by law might be liable to seizure.

The opinion was delivered by
nILLER, District Judge.-This propeller was seized by the collector at the port of Milwaukee, on the 7th day of August 1865.
1 We are indebted for this case to the courtesy of Hon. A. G. tMI-ER, District
Judge of Wisconsin.-EDs. Am. LAW REo.
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The information alleges and propounds as causes for the seizure:
1st. That distilled spirits in jugs and bottles, and not in casks or
vessels of the capacity of ninety gallons wine measure and upwards,.
said jugs and bottles containing less than ninety gallons wine
neasure each, were imported and brohght in the propeller, not
being for the use of the seamen on board, from the port of Sarnia,
in Canada, to Big Summer Island and Fox Island, in the United
States, contrary to the 103d section of the Act of Congress
approved March 2d 1799. 2d. That brandy contained in jugs
and bottles, and not in casks or vessels of the capacity of fifteen
gallons and upwards, was imported and brought in said propeller
to the port of Milwaukee, in the United States, from the port of
Sarnia, in Canada, the same not being for the use of the seamen
on board. 3d. That no manifest containing the said jugs and
bottles of distilled spirits was exhibited at the first port in the
United States as required by law.
The vessel was seized in pursuance of information from one
Royall Campbell, who had been employed as mate, and was discharged for drunkenness and incapacity for duty.
From the opening of navigation, in the spring of 1865, until
seized, the vessel was running between Green Bay and Sarnia,
Chicago and Milwaukee and Buffalo, touching at Sarnia.
The cook and a waiter, on the 12th of May 1865, secretly in
the night-time, at Sarnia, purchased and had brought on board
the vessel, three gallons of whiskey, three gallons of brandy, and
three"gallons of gin. On the 23d of the same month, at Sarnia,
they secretly in the night-time purchased and had brought on
board, three gallons of whiskey. And on the 1st of June, at
Sarnia, they, in the same manner, and at night, purchased and
had brought on board three gallons of whiskey.
It was a standing rule of the vessel that no distilled spirits
should be brought on board at Canada ports, by employees. And
the cook and waiter being aware of the rule, and also of the positive orders of the captain to that effect, in purchasing ship-stores
at Sarnia, requested that the jugs containing spirits purchased of
a grocer there, be secreted in barrels under the stores. They
deposited the jugs of spirits in a state-room occupied by the waiter,
and in a pantry adjoining the kitchen, out of view. Distilled
spirits were purchased at Chicago and Milwaukee by officers and
men, in the several trips of the vessel. Whiskey was delivered

U. S. v. PROPELLER GOVERNOR CUSHMAN.

to workmen at Summer Island and Fox Island. And at these
places men drank on board secretly and carried in bottles placed
in their pockets, some of the spirits smuggled at Sarnia wita some
apurchased at American ports. The cook received payment for
those spirits so sold.
The clerk and the owner of the pier at Fox Island settled for
whiskey some of the men had purchased of the cook, by crediting
the amount on a bill of wood supplied the vessel, under the belief
that the liquor had been brought from Chicago or Milwaukee.
The captain and clerk drank liquor handed them by the cook,
without compensation. They had no knowledge that any distilled
spirits had been brought on board at Sarnia or any other Canadian port, by any of the hands, except a case of gin ordered by
the captain, until the vessel was seized.
By § 103 of an Act of Congress approved Marca 2d 1799, 1
Stat. at Large 701, no distilled spirits (arrack and sweet cordial
excepted) shall be imported or brought into the United States,
except in casks or vessels of the capacity of ninety gallons wine
measure and upwards, on pain of forfeiture of the said distilled
spirits imported contrary to the provisions described, together
with the ship or vessel in which they shall be so imported: Provided, That nothing contained in this act shall be construed to
forfeit any spirits for being imported or brought into the United
States, in other casks or vessels, or the ship or vessel in which
they shall be brought, if such spirits shall be for the use of the
seamen on board such ship or vessel, and shall not exceed the
quantity of four gallons for each seaman. And by § 1 of an act
approved MKarch 2d 1827, 4 Stat. at Large 238, brandy may be
imported into the United States in casks of a capacity not less
than fifteen gallons.
It is conceded that the owners of a ship or vessel are liable for
the acts of the captain, as their agent, in the discharge of his
official duties, but the cook and waiter are mere employees, as
hands on board under the control of the captain, and may be discharged at his will, subject to provisions of law and the terms of
their employment.
A cargo of a vessel is the lading of a ship or vessel; the merchandise or wares contained and conveyed in a ship or vessel.
A vessel is not liable to forfeiture for every apparent violation
or breach of the Revenue Laws, in regard to the cargo. Acci.
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dental mistakes may be accounted for and explained. Where
actions, suits, or informations are brought for penalties or seizures,
and the government make out a primd facie case, section 71 of
the Act of M1arch 2d 1799 throws the burden of explanation
upon the claimant: The Juminary, 8 Wheat. 407. And by
section 67 of the same act the officers of the customs, after entry
made of goods, wares, or merchandise, may, on suspicion of
fraud, open and examine the packages. And if any of the packages so examined shall be found to differ in their contents from
the entry, then the contents of such packages shall be forfeited:
Provided, that the said forfeiture shall not be incurred, if it shall
be made to appear to the satisfaction of the officer, or the court
in which a prosecution shall be had, that such difference proceeded from accident or mistake, and not from an intention to
defraud the reveaue. In The United States v. Nine Packagesof
Linen, 1 Paine's C. 0. Rep., it is decided that when goods are
libelled, under the said section 67, for disagreeing with the entries,
and the claimant sets up mistake as an excuse, the circumstance
that probable cause of seizure has been made out, does not impose
on the claimant the necessity of making out an unusually clear
case of mistake. All he has to do is to produce ordinary proof.
It was there holden, as sufficient and legal excuse for an incorrect
entry of goods, that they were entered from an invoice made out
in great hurry and agitation, while the goods were packed at
Caen, in the absence of the owner, in order to secure them by
removal from an apprehended pillage by Prussian soldiery who
occupied the place. It seems to be the policy of the law, that
intention to defraud the revenue may be a proper subject of
inquiry, and to allow the claimant to show an accidental omission
or neglect: The United States v. The Margaret Gates, 22
Verm. 603.
The distilled spirits mentioned in the information having been
received on board secretly by employees or servants of the vessel,
without the knowledge of the captain or clerk, and in violation
of a standing rule and positive order, the owners of the vessel
would not be liable for their loss. They formed no part of the
cargo, to be placed in the manifest as such. Nor should the
vessel be subject to forfeiture under the circumstances. The
spirits or such portion as the cook and waiter were not allowed
by law might be liable to seizure.
VOL.
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In the case of Philo v. The Ship Anna, 1 Dall. 197, it
appeared in evidence that the captain of the vessel had only
exhibited twenty hampers of porter in his official manifest, while
a much greater quantity was found on board the ship, besides
forty-two hampers landed and deposited in the store of one Smith,
and twenty-four hampers actually delivered on shore to the captam himself, agreeably to his order given for that purpose, in the
store of claimants. It was known likewise that a considerable
number of hampers of porter had during the passage been
removed from the hold and stored away in state-rooms, filling
them from the floor to the ceiling. And it appeared that the
owners and their agents had been on board before the removal
of the hampers from that situation, and must have seen them.
The gross number of the hampers discovered by the informants
was computed at a little over eighteen tons. ' The vessel was
rightly condemned, but the charge of the court is instructive in
the following remark: " The case in Bunburg is the single one
that reaches the point before us. There the question arises
whether the goods put on board secretly, and unloaded without
the knowledge of the captain, would occasion a confiscation; and
judges agreed that if it was a small matter, and no part of the
cargo, it would not. The claimant, therefore, to have the benefit
of this case should show: 1st, That the subject of the present
prosecution is a small matter; 2d, That it was no part of the
cargo ; 3d, That it was smuggled without the knowledge of the
captain." All these positions are satisfactorily established in
favor of claimant. The distilled spirits taken on board in the
darkness of the night at Sarnia, on the three several occasions
by the cook and waiter, were no part of the cargo, were smuggled
without the knowledge of the captain or clerk, and they were a
very small matter not deserving the seizure of the vessel by the
collector, in the strict enforcement of the Revenue Law, according
to their requirements.
The law under which the information is brought allows to each
seaman a quantity of distilled spirits for his use on board, not
exceeding four gallons. The cook, steward, and waiters in lake
vessels are considered and classed as seamen or mariners. They
are a necessary part of the crew. They frequently assist in the
navigation and care of the vessel at times of pressing necessity.
They are allowed a lien in the admiralty for their wages in
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common with the sailors: Flanders on Maritime Law, §§ 438,
439, 440, and notes.
On the 12th of May the cook and waiter brought on board nine
gallons of spirits ; on the two subsequent occasions they brought
on board three gallons. If by the law these men were entitled to
bring into the United States four gallons for each to be used on
board, on every trip of the vessel, then they only exceeded their
allowance as to quantity on one occasion, to the amount of one
gallon.
The policy of the law will not allow seamen to -smuggle on
'board even their own allowance of distilled spirits. The captain
is responsible for the acts of the seamen in this particular, in all
cases coming to his knowledge. If he consents to such traffic, or
connives at it, he may subject his vessel to seizure.
The captain and clerk may have drunk of these liquors without
knowledge or suspicion of their having been brought on board at
Sarnia secretly, or that the cook and waiter were making merchandise of them. Distilled spirits having been brought on board,
on all the trips of the vessel at American ports, and freely used
and disposed of, the captain and clerk might not suspect that
Canada liquors were either drunk or purchased at Big Summer
and Fox Islands, by persons not belonging to the vessel. The
spirits smuggled at Sarnia, being of small bulk and stored away
in disregard of the captain's orders and a standing rule of the
vessel, the testimony of the captain and clerk that they bad no
idea that the spirits they drank on board or that were drunk by
others had been smuggled at Sarnia, is entitled to favorable consideration. It is not probable that this traffic in foreign distilled
spirits on board the vessel would be allowed. Domestic spirits
may be drunk and sold on board without risk of forfeiture of
either the spirits or the vessel. And it is no cause of forfeiture
under the act, for a seaman to extend the courtesy of his bottle of
foreign spirits to an officer without compensation, in the absence
of knowledge on the part of the officer that such spirits had been
smuggled.
The captain had a legal right to order on board the case of gin,
not exceeding four gallons, which he used on board.
The distilled spirits mentioned in the information not having
been received on board as part of the cargo, it was not placed ir
the manifest, and the vessel is not liable for not exhibiting a
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manifest containing it, at the first American port touched at after
leaving Sarnia.
I am satisfied that the information should be dismissed.

Supreme Court of New York, Seventh Jistrict.
NATHANIEL R. PORTER v. JOHN MOUNT AND HARRIET MOUNT.
In an action for money had and received, for usurious interest, against husband
and wife, not as such but as joint debtors simply, where they defended separately
and a verdict was given against the wife alone, the jury not passing on the husband's defence, the plaintiff was allowed to discontinue his complaint against the
husband and retain his verdict against the wife.
Where the agent of the lender bargains for and obtains excess of interest for his
own use and benefit alone, but with the knowledge of the principal, per JomEsof,
P. J., and J. C. SmiTx, J., the usury affects the whole transaction and the principal
is liable for it; per E. D. SmiTu, J., the principal should not be liable unless the
bonus or excess given to the agent was made a condition of the loan.
The case of Condit v. Baldwin, 21 New York Rep. 224, observed upon.
Permission to the jury to take -outwith them papers or written documents used
as evidence on the trial, is entirely within the discretion of the judge presiding at
the trial, without regard to the consent of parties.

R. -L. Dorr & Scott Lord, for plaintiff.
Bemis & Stevens, for defendants.
The opinion of the court was delivered by
E. DARwiN SMITH, J.-When this case was before us on a
former occasion (vide 3 Am. Law Reg. N. S. 493), it came up
on a motion for a new trial, the plaintiff having been nonsuited at
the circuit on the ground chiefly that the action was barred by
the statute limiting actions by the borrower against the lender,
for usury paid, to the period of one year after such payment.
And the question raised and discussed was, whether a married
woman having a separate estate and loaning money on usury, was
liable to be sued for the excess received over legal interest, so as
to charge her separate estate.
We held that the action was not barred by statute, but lay at
common law, and as for money had and received, and granted a
new trial on both grounds. Vide 41 Barb. 562.
On the second trial the jury having found a verdict against
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Mrs. Mount alone, and rendered no verdict for or against her
husband, the plaintiff now asks leave to amend the complaint so
as to retain the verdict, and the defendants move for a new trial.
The complaint in the action charges the defendants jointly with
the receipt of the usurious excess, and does not state that they
are husband and wife. They are sued simply as joint debtors, and
judgment is prayed against them jointly. The defendants have
defended separately, and both deny the complaint.
The jury having only passed upon half the issue, and not having
found upon the issue joined upon the answer of John Mount, there
is an evident mistrial, and no judgment can be entered upon this
verdict.
The plaintiff asks to amend the complaint by inserting in it the
proper statement alleging that the defendants are husband and
wife, so that the verdict may stand retaining John Mount's name
in the record as husband, but without any judgment against him,
and if this cannot be done, he asks leave to discontinue against
him, and retain the verdict against his wife, and enter up judgment against her to be charged upon her separate estate. If John
Mount is a necessary party upon the record, the plaintiff cannot,
I think, be allowed to amend the complaint, except upon the payment of costs. He was sued as joint contractor in making the
loans, and as jointly liable to refund the usurious excess over
legal interest; and he has defended the action successfully so far
that the plaintiff has recovered no verdict against him, and he
was clearly entitled, if not liable for the usury, to have a verdict
rendered in his favor.
If the plaintiff, therefore, is to be allowed to amend his complaint by inserting therein the proper allegations to retain the
name of John Mount upon the record, as the husband of Harriet.
upon the assumption that he was a proper party with his wife to
the action, although no personal claim was made or recovery
could be had against him, it could be only properly done, I think.
upon the payment of his full costs, as upon a dismissal of the
complaint against him.
But I do not think this would be correct practice. In common
law actions the name of no person should be in or upon the
record as a party, except such as must have judgment pass for
or against them. Married women now sue and are suable like
unmarried women, and judgments are rendered for and against
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them, and enforced in the same manner as for or against other
persons under the statutes of 1860 and 1862.
In common law actions before the Code, where husband and
wife are necessary parties, judgment always went in favor of or
against both, but was collected primarily of the husband's property if he had any; if not, it might be charged in equity upon
the wife's separate estate. Executions on such judgment went
only against the property of the husband, for the reason that the
wife had no separate personal property-all her personal property on her marriage vesting in her husband, and the usufruct
of her real estate, during coverture, belonging to him.
To reach the wife's separate property now, she must be sued
alone, otherwise the judgment against both is really a judgment
against the husband as at common law. I can think of no case
at common law where a husband can be a proper nominal party,
and be sued merely as such with his wife. But the plaintiff, I
think, might be allowed to dismiss the complaint, and discontinue
the action against John Mount to the same effect as if a verdict
had been found in his favor at the circuit, and enter judgment on
the verdict against Harriet Mount.
I see no difficulty in granting the plaintiff's motion in this
respect, if we are satisfied that justice requires it, or would be
subserved thereby, and that the verdict was in all respects just
and fair, and no valid exceptions were taken at the trial.
This brings us to the consideration of the defendants' crossmotion for a new trial. The exceptions taken to the refusal of
the circuit judge to nonsuit the plaintiff, or dismiss the complaint
as to one or the other of the defendants, I think are not well
taken. The jury might, upon the evidence, have found a verdict
against John 'Mount or against Mrs. Alount, and for the other
defendant, and I do not think the judge was bound to take the
case frohm the jury; and the same view applies to the exceptions
to refusal of the judge, at the close of the trial, to charge the jury
that there was no evidence to warrant a verdict for the plaintiff,
which was equivalent to an application to the circuit judge to
direct a verdict for the defendants, which I think he was not
bound to do.
It is true, the evidence against 'Mrs. 'Mount was very slight,
tending to charge her with any knowledge of or assent to the
receipt by her husband of the sums of money mentioned in the
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complaint; but I am not prepared to say that it was so slight that
it shouid not have been submitted to the jury, and we are not
now seriously asked by counsel to set the verdict aside as without
evidence, or as so entirely against the evidence.
Another exception taken, was to the refusal of the judge to
charge as requested, that the evidence must satisfy the jury
beyond any reasonable doubt, that the defendant, Harriet Mount,
received or authorized the reception by John Mount as her agent
of the several sums mentioned in the complaint, or some of them,
or else the defendant was entitled to a verdict. This request was
right, and asked a proper direction to the jury, except in respect
to rule relating to the weight of the evidence which it asked the
judge to apply. It asked the judge to instruct the jury to apply
to the evidence the liberal and benign rule which juries are
ordinarily instructed to apply in favor of the defendants to the
evidence on criminal trials. It is true, that the taking of usury
is a criminal offence, and in a civil action involves a forfeiture,
but I do not think that courts or juries should lean particularly in
favor of the usurer. A verdict finding usury should doubtless be
based upon clear and satisfactory evidence, as it involves, by way
of penalty, the loss of the whole debt; and I do iot think that
the charitable rule of giving to defendants, in favor of life or
liberty, the benefit of every reasonable doubt should be extended
to the civil actions in such cases. I think the judge rightly disposed of this question,
Another exception was taken on the ground that the circuit
judge allowed the jury, against the objection of the defendants'
counsel, to take to their room the bond and mortgage received in
evidence on the trial.
In England there are some cases, and perhaps in this country,
where new trials have been granted on such grounds, but it is
time they were exploded and repudiated. In Graham on New
Trials, p. 80, it is said: " That in this state the practice is not to
allow the juries to have the papers produced in evidence without the consent of the parties." If written documents or papers
used in evidence on a trial can only be taken to a jury-room upon
the consent of the parties, it is quite apparent that the practice in
such cases stands upon a very uncertain footing. Such consent
will many times be withheld when the papers and documents
would materially aid the jury in their deliberations. It is pro.
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perly a question to bo left unqualifiedly to the discretion of the
circuit judge.
The judges who preside at Nisi Prius find constant occasions
where the written evidence used on the trial should be allowed
to go to the jury-rooms; and I think we should assert and
hold the true rule and the law to be, that the judge at the circuit
may in all cases, in his discretion, with or without the consent of
the parties, allow the jury to take to their room any written documents or papers received or used in evidence on the trial of a
cause. The circuit judge in thig case exercised his discretion
properly in allowing the mortgage in question to be taken to the
jury-room, and this exception should be overruled.
There is one other exception in the case which I find some
difficulty in overruling.
The learned judge, in his charge to the jury, among other
things, said: "That if the defendant, Harriet Mount, knew that
the defendant, John Mount, was receiving money on his own
account from the plaintiff, on account of the loan, she would be
liable for the money so paid."
I do not think that the proposition can be sustained. The
action is a common law action for money had and received. To
support such action it is necessary to prove that the defendant
herself, or by her agent, actually received money for the use of
the plaintiff: Childs on Contracts 602.
The form of the indebitatus count for money bad and received
is, that the defendant is indebted to the plaintiff in a certain sum
for money had and received by the defendant for the use of the
plaintiff.
There is no evidence and no pretence in the case that the
defendant, Mrs. Mount, ever received or had one cent of the
money for which this action was brought and the verdict rendered.
It confessedly never was, or any part of it, in her possession or
control, or was applied to her use or benefit. A recovery against
her for such money, therefore, cannot be had, put, or sustained,
except upon the ground that it was received by her agent for her
use or benefit. There is no other ground upon which she can be
held liable for this money, at least in this action.
The proposition in the charge, to which the exception I am
considering applies, assumes that Mrs. Mount did not receive the
money, and that it was not received for her use and benefit, or by
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her authority or direction. It is, "if 'Mrs. Mount knew that John
Mount was receiving money on his own account from the plaintiff
on account of the loan, she would be liable for it." This proposition, it seems to me, is in conflict with the very theory and
essential principle upon which the action for money had and
received rests.
John Mount received this money; he had it in his possession;
he received it for his own use-applied it to his own use and
benefit.
But the charge in this particular doubtless was made upon the
principle, and proceeded upon the assumption, that the action for
money had and received would be for the usurious excess over
legal interest whenever a contract was infected with usury.
In this view the charge asserted and in effect implied, that the
contract for the loan of the $1000 to the plaintiff, and the two
agreements to extend the time or payment of such loan would be
usurious if Harriet Mount knew that John Mount was receiving
money on account of such loan from the plaintiff, though it was
for his own exclusive use and benefit. The proposition in the
broad and unqualified sense, it seems to me, is opposed to the law
of usury as asserted and applied in the case of Condlit v. Baldwin, 21 New York 224, and 21 Barb. 185, and other cases.
That case, so far as it stands upon any principle, which I much
doubt, can only stand and be sustained upon the ground that the
premium of 825, received in that case by the agent of the plaintiff upon the loan, was received for the sole use of the agent, and
was not received for the use and benefit of the lender, or upon
her authority or assent.
In the opinion in that case in this court, my brother JoHNsoNx
said: 11But when the agent of the lender and the borrower agree
without the knowledge, and in no respect for his benefit or advantage, that such agent shall have a commission out of the moneys
loaned, it must, I think, be held to be the agreement of the agent,
and he alone, if any one, should be held accountable for the
wrong." And in the Court of Appeals, Judge DAVIES, who gave
the opinion of the court in the same case, says: "The agent has
taken and received this gratuity or usury, and not the principal.
To render the transaction usurious as to this plaintiff, we have to
establish that she took and received the unlawful interest, and
from this fact infer the corrupt intent. Williams took it for alleged
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services rendered by him. Can it for a moment be contended
that the plaintiff could have recovered this money of Williams as
so much mhoney paid to him for her use ? Clearly not." He says,
further: "1Baldwin had an action to recover the excess, but
against whom could he have maintained it? Certainly not against
the plaintiff; she never took or received it. Her agent was
never authorized to take or receive it. On no principle could the
action have been maintained against her."
That is precisely this case. But the action is brought to recover
the usurious excess, and is brought against the principal. Judge
DAVIES said such actions could not be maintained against the
plaintiff in that case, because she had never received the money,
or authorized her agent to receive it.
This was the reason why that was not a case of usury-because
the lender had not received or agreed to receive any excess over
legal interest, and the usurious excess, confessed and received by
her agent, was received for his own use and benefit, and not for
the use of his principal. In Fellows v. Tlhe Commissioners of
Oneida, 86 Barb. 698, which presented substantially the same
facts as that of Condit v. Baldwin, and was decided on the authority of that case, Judge BAcoN, in giving the opinion of the court,
says: " The rule, therefore, that when an agent, while strictly
pursuing his authority, commits a wrong, he thereby binds his
principal, does not apply to a case where the agent, departing
from the line of his duty, is bargaining on his own account, and
securing a benefit for his own private advantage exclusively."
That is this case precisely, assuming that John Mount was the
agent of his wife, which he and Mrs. Mount distinctly deny.
The only question which remains in this connection is, whether
the principle is or is not affected by the knowledge or want of
knowledge by the lender, that the agent is receiving a bonus or
premium upon the loan.
In Condit v. Baldwin, it is mentioned, and some stress is laid
upon it in the opinions, that the plaintiff was ignorant of the fact
that Williams exacted and received the $25 premium. If this fact
of knowledge was essential to the decision, the plaintiff in that
case must, it seems to me, be deemed to have had knowledge of
the fact of the taking and payment of the premium, for Williams
made the contract of loan and advanced the money himself. lie
was not an agent to procure the loans. He made the loans him-
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self. The contract of loan was a single one, and made by him
with the money of his principal in hand.
The agreement to pay the 825 premium was part and parcel
of the contract, and it is impossible, therefore, it seems to me, to
hold that it did not affect and taint it, except upon the single consideration that the premium in question was stipulated for and
received by and for the sole benefit and use of the agent, and that
the principal actually lent and advanced to the borrower the full
sum specified in the security, and in no way received any benefit
from the premium or bonus paid her agent.
But this case, it seems to me, stands upon much firmer ground
than that of Condit v. Baldwin, for in this case Mrs. Mount herself actually lent her own money. The application to loan the
money was made to her in person, and she agreed to make the
loan, and actually advanced the money to the plaintiff, and took
the security in her own name, and she swore that she was accustomed to do her own business, and that her husband was not her
agent to make the loan, or do any act in regard to it.
It is quite apparent, from the evidence, that Mount took advantage of his position and relation, as the husband of Mrs. Mount,
to sell his services and influence with her to procure the original
loan to the plaintiff; and to extend the same from time to time for
the sums of money paid to him by the plaintiff.
He performed the office of broker, or intermediate man between
the parties to negotiate the loan and the extension, and extorted
the money paid him by the plaintiff in consideration of such services. This would not affect the validity of the contract, inasmuch as Mrs. "Mountactually advanced the full sum of $1000 of
her own money on the loan, and received nothing but legal interest, within the following cases and others: Dagnall v. Wigley, 11
East 42; Coster v. Dilworth, 8 Cowen 299; Barretto v. Snowden), 5 Wend. 181; Crane v. Riubbell, 7 Paige 413.
It is the constant practice of brokers and agents to negotiate
'oans, and receive payment by way of commission, or otherwise,
I r their services, and it must be generally well known to lenders
.hat the broker in such cases is to receive a compensation for his
services. The fact of the mere knowledge of the lender in such
cases that his agent or broker, or the common agent or broker of
the parties, is paid by the borrower a commission or other compensation, can in no case affect the validity of the contract, except
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when advantage is taken through such agent by some device to
secure more than legal interest to such lender to go to such agent
on the money lent.
The case of 31eagoe v. Simmons, 1 Moody & Malkin 121, illustrates this point. In this case an agent had procured a loan of
$1000, and retained $100 for his services.
Lord TENTERDEN said, in his charge to the jury, that if the
lender had caused the transaction to pass through the hands of
Coats (the broker), in order that he might receive the premium
over and above the regular discount, that would be usury, though
he retained nothing himself beyond the legal interest. Referring
to that case, my brother JOHNSON, in Gondit v. Baldwin, supra,
said of it, " to this rule I subscribe. In such a case payment to
the agent, at the request and as a condition imposed by the lender
himself, is a payment to him."
This I think entirely sound. If a lender imposes or makes it
a condition of the loan that a bonus or p)remium 'should be paid to
his agent, such sum should be deemed paid to the principal, and
should affect the validity of the contract, and be recoverable precisely as if made to the lender himself.
But nothing of that kind is proved or pretended in this case,
and the cause was not submitted to the jury upon any such
ground, nor can the verdict, I think, be sustained upon any such
theory of the case.
This question comes before us upon exceptions to a particular
portion of the charge. The whole charge is not given, and we
cannot therefore see that this proposition was qualified or explained,
so that no injury was done by the apparent error.
The proposition in the .charge, as it stands, negatives the idea
that the money received by Mount was received for the use and
benefit of Mrs. Mount, or was received by any authority, consent,
contrivance, or connivance on her part, and forbids the jury to
render a verdict upon any such theory or assumption.
I cannot see how she can be liable for money so received in a
simple action at common law for money had and received.
For this error in the charge, therefore, I think there should be
a new trial.
But my brethren think differently from me on this single point.
For the reason expressed in the opinion of my brother Jollxsoa,
a new trial as against Mrs. Mount must therefore be denied, and
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we all concur that the complaint should be dismissed as against
Mr. Mlount, and as he is the more guilty party, and the money
received by him for his services was quite extortionate in amount,
we think the provision of section 306 of the code, where several
defendants are sued not united in interest, and making separate
defences, we have discretion to deny him costs, as upon a verdict
in his favor, and the complaint as against him should therefore be
dismissed without costs, and it is so ordered.
JOHNSON, P. J.-I concur fully in my brother E. DARWiN SmITH'S
3pinion in this case, except that portion relating to so much of the
charge as instructed the jury, "that if the defendant John Mount
was receiving money on his own account from the plaintiff, on
account of the loan, she would be liable for the money he paid."
I am clearly of the opinion that this part of the charge was correct, in view of the evidence in the case, and of the peculiar character of the transaction. The whole charge is not given in tho
case, but so much and such parts only as are excepted to. The
action was brought to recover back the sum of $286, paid as
usurious premium upon the loan of $1000, as follows :-$186 at
the time of making the loan for one year; $100 for extending it
one year thereafter; and $50 for extending it still another year.
The evidence on the part of the plaintiff tended to show that
John Mount, the husband, made the bargain with the plaintiff for
the loan, and for the extension, for Harriet the wife, and that she
knew the character of the bargain he made with the plaintiff. The
usurious premiums were all paid to the husband, though some of
them were paid in the house and upon the table when the wife was
present in and out of the room attending to her household affairs.
Harriet the wife on the other han4 testified, that she never
authorized the taking of any usury, an never knew that any had
been paid, and never received any. That she made the loan herself and for lawful interest only. John Mount, the husband, also
testi~fed, that his wife had no knowledge of the usurious part of
the agreement when it was made, and that he never paid her any
portion of the usurious premium he received; that she never
authorized him to bargain for or to take usury on account of the
loan, and knew nothing of that part of the agreement until after
wvards.
The money loaned was the separate property of the wife. It
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will be seen, therefore, that it became a question upon the trial,
whether these extraordinary and unconscionable exactions were
usurious in their character as respected the lender, Airs. Mount,
and if they were, whether she would be liable in an action for the
recovery back of the money thus paid. It was clearly in 'reference to this aspect of the case that the charge was made as above
stated. This being the only part of the charge set out in the case,
the presumption must be that the law was laid down to the jury
correctly as to the agency of the husband, and the binding nature
of his acts upon the principal, and all other matters pertinent to
the case as it was presented by the evidence.
The precise question then would necessarily arise, in case the
lender was cognisant of the acts of the person acting on her
behalf, so as to bind the agreement as to her with the usury exacted
and paid; whether she would be liable in this action even though
the money did not come to her hands, but was received by her
husband, and retained by him for his own benefit with her knowledge. In such a case it seems to me there can be no doubt of the
legal character of such usurious payments. The jury of course
found from the evidence that all this was done with her knowledge
and consent.
That she consented he might take this usurious premium, and
also that he might retain it as his own. But it was, nevertheless,
paid on account of the loan, and as part of the bargain by which
the loan was secured and the time extended. It was her bargain
although made by her agent, and all the money paid upon her
contract was in contemplation of law paid to her, although received
by an agent.
Her knowledge and sanction of the bargain of the agent made
it hers in all its parts of which she had knowledge, and to which
she made no dissent. The transaction is a unit and cannot be
separated. To hold that the principal was liable for a part, and
the agent only for another, would necessarily imply that one portion was the act of the agent and not of the principal. This was
the case of Condit v. Baldwin, 21 N. Y. R. 219; s. c. 21 Barb.
181.
In that case it was held that the principal was not liable for the
act of the agent, and the contract not tainted as respected her,
precisely because the agent acted for his own exclusive benefit
and advantage, without any knowledge or assent of his principal
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whatever : who had never heard of the usurious part of the trans
action, had never authorized it, and never received any portion
of the unlawful premium, and never knew that any had been paid
to the agent. That has been regarded by judges and the profession generally, I think, as an extreme case, and as extending the
exemption of the principal from the legal consequences of the
improper and even unauthorized acts of agents in the business they
are employed to transact, quite as far as any rule can warrant.
That decision, however, in view of the peculiar facts of the case,
stands, I think, upon a sound principle. But the facts there upon
the turning-point were just the reverse of the facts in this case as
found by the jury. Here, the principal knew what the agent was
doing in her business and with her money, and that the borrower
was paying on account of her loan to him. She consented that
her husband and agent should receive the money upon the corrupt
bargain, and cannot shield herself upon the plea that her agent has
never paid it to her, but has kept it himself by her consent.
Payment to him in such a case is payment to her. It would be
exceedingly dangerous, as it seems to me, and lead in practice to
a complete evasion of the statute, to hold a contrary doctrine in a
case like this; all corrupt loans would be made through agents,
and all the lender would have to do to save himself, would be to
agree that the agent might keep for his own benefit whatever
exorbitant exaction he might demand and obtain.
I think the charge in this respect was correct in point of law,
and was in strict accordance with the decision in Condit v.
Baldwin.
It follows from this that a new trial as to the defendant Harriet
Mount should be denied, and the complaint dismissed as against
John Mount, with costs of the action.

